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A STUDY INTO THE ORIGINS AND NATURE
OF PERFORMANCE AND PROGRAM BUDGETING
by
William M. Ileisskopf
Lieutenant Commander, Supply Corps, United States Navy
Performance budgeting has been a by-word within the Department of
Defense for over ten years. It was proposed as a means of finding
out what was done with the money expended for military programs.
The program budget is now being introduced in order to achieve this
same purpose. This study sought to define both of these terms as
they relate to military budgeting. In the course of this study,
the major proposals for program or performance budgeting were re-
viewed. The program budget was found to be a meaningful and useful
concept. The performance budget did not meet either of these cri-
teria, nor was it subject to an exact definition.
May 1962
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CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEM AND ITS ORIGINS
Since the conclusion of World War II, the amount of funds
expended for National Defense has become a major concern to the
American People. In the present era, with defense spending rising
to over 50 Billion dollars each year, the method of spending this
money receives increased attention. This attention has given im-
petus to a wide range of proposals for budgetary reform. These
proposals are usually referred to as either performance or program
type budgeting. The terms have been used interchangebly by some
authors giving rise to a certain amount of confusion with regard
to their true meaning.
I THE PROBLEM
Statement of the problem . It was the purpose of this study
to enquire into the origins of the terms performance and program
budgeting in order to determine if the two concepts possess a sep-
arate and discernible identity. In the course of the study, the
major proposals for program or performance budgeting were reviewed
in an attempt to present a universal definition of the two terms*
Importance of the study. Performance budgeting has been
used in defense spending for the past fifteen years. Although the

term has been given much publicity, it is difficult to find two
authors who agree on an exact interpretation of what the term ac-
tually means. The program budget was introduced into the budget
cycle in fiscal year 1963 • The importance of this type of budgeting
was attested to by Mr. Bell in a recent statement before a Congres-
sional sub-committee.
So far as military planning and budgeting are concerned, we
believe that this (program package) will represent a consider-
able step forward over the older method of grouping expenditures
by service (Army, Navy, Air Force), and expenditure category
(personnel, procurement, research and development, etc.).
Since program budgeting has become an integral part of defense
spending, it is necessary that there be a clearer distinction made
between the two types of budgeting, performance and program.
II DEFINITION OF TERMS USED
The basis for this study was a review of the various defini-
tions or proposals that have been applied to performance and program
budgeting. Accordingly, it is not possible to present a definition
of these terms at this point in the study. A few of the more common
terms used in this study are defined below:
Appropriation . Appropriation has been defined as a statutory
authorization to make payments out of the Treasury for specified
Statement of David E. Bell, Director of the Bureau of the
Budget, before the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery of
the Senate Committee on Government Operations, July 2£, 1961.

purposes. The statutory definition of the term appearing in legis-
lation includes funds, authorization to create obligations by con-
tract in advance of approriations, and any authority making funds
2
available for obligation or expenditure.
Apportionment . An apportionment is a distribution by the
Bureau of the Budget of amounts available for obligation or expend-
iture in an appropriation into amounts available for specified time
periods, activities, functions, projects, objects, or combinations
thereof. The amounts so apportioned limit the obligations to be
3incurred, or when so specified, expenditures to be accrued.
Allocation . An allocation is the subdivision of apportioned
funds to the subhead level. The only subdivision of funds below this
h
level are allotments or suballotments.
Allotment . An allotment is an authorization between heads
or other authorized employees of an agency to incur obligations
within a specified amount pursuant to an appropriation or other
statutory provisions.




kpara. IV, DOD Directive 7200.1 (Aug. 18, 1955).
5Op. Cit., BuBud Circular.

Obligation * Obligations are amounts of orders placed, con-
tracts awarded, service received, and similar transactions during a
given period requiring the disbursement of money. Such amounts in-
clude disbursements not preceded by the recording of obligations and
reflect adjustments for differences between obligations and actual
disbursement s
•
III ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to a brief
resume of the historical development of budgeting. Chapter II con-
tains the background and development of performance and program
budgeting. In addition, it contains a review of the more significant
proposals for improved budgeting. The third and final chapter sum-
marized the salient characteristics of the two concepts and presents
some proposals relating to their true nature.
IV HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF BUDGETING
Budgets in government have had a history that is quite similar
to the development of the political institutions which they support.
The modern concept of a fixed amount of funding that is controlled
by the representatives of the people had its origin in the 12th
article of the Magna Carta which stated:
6Ibid.

No scutage or aid shall be imposed in the kingdom unless by-
common council of the realm, except for the purpose of ransom-
ing the King's person, making his first born son a knight, and
marrying his eldest daughter once, and the aids for this purpose
shall be reasonable in amount.
This interest or control over revenues was later extended to the
purpose for which the revenues were used. After the revolution of
1688, the Parliraent declared its ascendency by reserving the right
to authorize an expenditures made by the Crown. The English budg-
etary process was still in the process of evolution at the time of
the American revolution. There was no accepted British practice
which could be emulated by the framers of the Constitution.
The Constitution does follow the English precedent that all
revenue measures must originate in the lower house,- Beyond this,
it merely states that "No money shall be drawn from the treasury,
but in consequence of appropriations made by lawj and a regular
statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all
7
public money shall be published from time to time". During the
early formative years, the strong executive leadership taken by
Alexander Hamilton in his role as Secretary of the Treasury was
the prime force in developing a budget process. Henry James Ford
had the following to say about the period:
'The Constitution of the United States , Article I, Sect. °.

In the begining all the branches of government were bunched
together in their quarters so that the intercourse was ready and
easy without formal arrangements, and brief notices of the direct
presence of cabinet officials appearing in the records give an
adequate notion of the real extent of the intimacy. It was by
direct, personal administrative initiative that government was
set in operation. Only by such agency could the finances have
received the radical treatment by which Hamilton almost at a
stroke lifted the nation out of bankruptcy, established its cred-
it and secured its revenues•..His personal initiative transcended
even the function of an English Chancellor of the Exchequer on
which it was distinctly modelled, for he had no other compact
party on which he could depend.
°
This personal type of financial management continued until
1802 • During this period, the Lower House considered appropriation
acts as a committee of the whole. In 1802, the House established a
permanent Committee On Ways and Means. This marked the end of per-
sonal executive direction of Congressional Appropriations. In fact,
friction developed between the Administration and Congress to a
point where all communication became formal. The Congress exercised
a detailed interest in appropriation matters in order to curb exec-
9
utive discretion. The Congress enacted a series of laws that were
designed to strengthen its control over fiscal affairs.
Tienry James Ford, Budget Making and the Work of Government
,
(The Annals, November 1915), pp, U-5« Quoted from Jessee Burkhead,
Government Budgeting
,
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1956),
pp. 9-10.
'Arthur Smithies, The Budgetary Process in the United States
,
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1955), pp. 53^5U.

An act passed in 1809 required that officers who receive public
funds account for them in accordance with the appropriations, and
to apply thera solely to the purpose for which they were appropriated.
^
Other acts passed in 1817 and 1823 set limits on claims against the
government and prohibited unauthorized disbursement of government
11
funds.
From 1802 until 1865, the House Ways and Means Committee
dominated and controlled the spending and revenue measures of the
Government. The position of the Secretary of the Treasury became
that of a clerk who classified expenditures and tramsitted them to
the Congress. He had no interest in the size and purpose of the
funds being requested. The remainder of the President's cabinet
had a similar disinterest in financial planning. It was left to
the Ways and Means Committee to act as the review agency for all
government financing.
In 1865, a separate House Appropriations Committee was es-
tablished and this ended the period of unity that had prevailed
during the first 75 years of federal financial operations. By 1885,
there were eight different appropriation committees in the House,
each with the power to recommend the expenditure of public funds.
10Act of March 3, 1909 (2 Stat. 535).
^Act of March 3, 1817 (3 Stat. 366) and Act of Jan. 31,
1823 (3 Stat. 723).

This resulted in the rapid erosion of fiscal controls. The period
from 1880 until 1909 was characterized as one of extreme laxity in
federal spending. It was a period in which the major financial
problem faced by the Congress was the annual disposal of the large
12
surplus accumulated by the tariff.
The failure of Congress to exercise its responsibility created
a similar indifference within the Executive branch. The spending
plans of the executive departments bore little resemblence to the
appropriations enacted by the Congress. This situation was aptly
described by Wilmerding:
The departments governed their expenditures by the amounts of
the estimates rather than by the amounts of the grants. If in
any case less were granted than was estimated, the department or
bureau affected, instead of revising its plans for the coming
year to bring them within the financial limits of the reduced
appropriation, continued them without change in perfect confidence
that Congress would appropriate supplementary sums when they were
requested rather than stop the service. 13
The passage of the Anti-Deficiency Act in 1875 had little if any
effect on these excesses. This act prohibited any officer or em-
ployee of the government from making or authorizing an expenditure
or obligation under any appropriation or fund in excess of the a-
mount available therein or in advance of an appropriation, unless
Hi
the contract or obligation was authorized by law.
12Jesse Burkhead, Government Budgeting , (New York: John
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1956), pp. 9-12.
^Lucius Wilmerding, Jr., The Spending Power , (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 19^3) > p« 1U0.
^Revised Stat. 3679(a) (1875), 31 U.S.C. 665 (a) (1952).

The Congress did occasionally take action to prevent deficiencies
but this action had little success. The movement for budgetary re-
form did not receive much attention until the administration of
President Taft.
In 1909, the Congress began to recognize the need for a sem-
blance of coordination between revenue and expenditure. The Sundry
Civil Appropriations Act of that year required that the Secretary of
the Treasury should immediately inform the Congress when expenditures
exceded revenues. In addition, he was to advise the Congress on the
manner in which expenditures could be reduced or revenues raised to
such levels that would eliminate the deficit. Although this measure
had little effect, it did mark the begining of the end for the fis-
cal chaos that had characterized federal spending during the preced-
ing 25 years.
President Taft appointed a Commission on Economy and Effi-
ciency in 1°10 that spent two years analyzing the budget in terms
of an annual financial program. It also reviewed the organization
and complete operation of the federal government. The Commissions
report envisioned a multiple purpose budget. They recommended that
the budget be a document for Congressional action, an instrument of
control and management by the Chief Executive, and a basis for the
administration of the departments. Unfortunately, the Congress for
various political reasons was in no mood to accept the recommenda-
tions of the committee. Dispite this fact, the work of this commit-
tee did contribute to the pressure for budgetary reform which

eventually resulted in the passage of the Budget and Accounting Act
of 1921.
The establishment of the national budget in 1921 may be viewed
as the transition from a Congressional budget to an Executive budget.
It also marked the begining of attempts to introduce business like
financial methods into the government and was seen by at least one
15
author as the end of Congressional control over appropriations.
The establishment of the Bureau of the Budget and the preparation
of an executive budget were important milestones in the control of
federal spending. They did not however, cause any great change in
the basic appropriation structures. Federal spending continued to
be in terms of objects bought for the next 30 years in much the same
way as it had been since the days of Alexander Hamilton. It was not
until the appointment of the first Hoover Commission in 19U7 that
people within the federal government started thinking in terms of a
revised appropriation structure. The Commission recommended in its
19^9 report "that the whole budgetary concept of the federal govern-
ment should be refashioned by the adoption of a budget based upon
functions, activities, and projects.
^Clinton Rossiter, The American Presidency
,
(New York:
Harcourt, Brace, & Co., 1956) p 76. It is an extreme view and
would certainly receive an agrument from each President since 1921.
^Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the
Government, Budgeting and Accounting , Washington, 19U9, p» 8.
10

The term applied to this type of budgeting was performance. This
recommendation marks the begining of what has been described as




REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
There has been a considerable amount of writing devoted to
performance and program budgeting. This writing is conveniently-
divided into two broad categories. First there is the history of
the development of actual performance or program applications in
budgeting. The second category concerns the theoretical develop-
ment of proposals for "true" performance or program budgets. This
summary will engage but a few of these applications and proposals
but they were considered to be the most important and the most re-
presentative of the literature written on the subject*
THE DEVELOPMENT OF PERFORMANCE BUDGETING
The term performance must have some recognizable and defin-
itive features if it is to be used in describing a type of budget-
ing. Althou- h the purpose of this study was to define performance,
a point of departure had to be established in order to recognize the
various forms of performance budgeting. Jesse Burkhead wrote that
"performance budgeting can be most appropriately associated with a
budget classification that emphasizes the things which a government
does, rather than the things which a government buys. Performance
budgeting shifts the emphasis from the means of accomplishment to
the accomplishment itself."
Jesse Burkhead, Government Budgeting , op . cit ., p« 133.
12

The first attempt to construct a performance type budget was
attributed by A. E. Buck to the Borough of Richmond, New York City,
in the years 1°13-1°15« This type of budgeting was then known as
a cost-data budget. The New York Bureau of Municipal Research
assisted the Borough of Richmond in establishing a detailed classi-
fication system for three public works functions, viz., street clean-
ing, sewerage, and street maintenance. These functions were each
divided into ten subfunctions that were termed work classifications.
Physical units of measure, such as miles of street to be maintained
were presented in the budget document along with unit costs, and a
distribution of outlays by the various objects of expenditures for
each subfunction. It is not difficult to understandy why this pro-
cedure was abandoned two years after its inception.
There were other attempts to construct cost-data budgets
during the Thirties and Forties at both the federal and local levels
of government. Of these, the most notable were Richmond, Virginia,
and the TVA. Mr. Buck's work on the Hoover Commission seems to have
been instrumental in introducing the concept to Washington in 1°U7«
However there were a number of agencies thinking along these same
lines*
p
A.E. Buck, "Performance Budgeting for the Federal Government",
Tax Review, July, 19k9*
13

A group within the Navy Department had constructed the fiscal year
19JU8 budget in appropriation form and also on a program basis. It
3
was this group that brought the idea to the attention of Mr. Hoover.
The report of the Hoover Commission led to the adoption in
19h9 of Section 1*03 of Title IV Public Law 216. This Act introduced
performance budgeting into the Department of Defense. It prescribed
that budget estimates be prepared, presented, and justified and pro-
grams be administered "in such form and manner as the Secretary of
Defense
. . . .nay determine ...and on a performance basis; and that they
be set forth in a readily comparable form." The vagueness of these
words requires that a distinction be made between the concept of per-
formance budgeting and the practice.
In spite of the apparent simplicity of the concept and in spite
of the modification in budgetary classifications and appropriation,
there is still much question as to whether these departments in
fact have performance budgets.
^
If there were any one point upon which most authors in this field
agree, it is that there is no precise definition for a performance
budget. It has been given meaning by different groups according to
their own position.
^Frederick G. Mosher, Program Budgeting
,
(Chicago: Public




Political economists and legislators think of performance budgeting
as a reduction in the variety of appropriations. A means to sim-
plify and clarify the review of expenditures by the costing of spe-
cific programs. Members of the Executive departments visualize it
as a means of obtaining greater flexibility and freedom in their
decision making. They also expect that a performance budget will
afford greater control and accountability over their subordinates.
To the operator, a performance budget might mean a single source of
funds based upon performance of a given function and a considerable
amount of latitude in the attainment of this objective. Finally,
the accountant equates performance budgeting with accrual account-,
ing, separation of capital from operating expenditures, cost centers
with measurable performance, revolving funds, and a whole host of
other accounting refinements.
It was for these reasons that the budgets which were intro-
duced into the armed forces in the early 1950' s were not performance
budgets. The name was applied to budgetary reforms that were then
absolutely essential to prevent the accounting structure from fall-
ing apart. The Navy reduced the number of its appropriations from
U8 to 21 titles. The Army from 21 to 8, and the new Air Forces
system used but 9* However, the appropriation titles bore little
resemblence to the functions, activites, and projects recommended
by the Hoover Commission. Each appropriation funded what might be
described as a program but there was no basis within the program for
15

the measure of accomplishment. In each case, the end product or size
of the program had more relation to the amount of money appropriated
than it did to the manner in which the program objective was attained,
The introduction of the program package in the fiscal 1963 budget did
not address itself to this problem since here again the measurement
criteria is lacking. This subject will be explored in greater detail
in a later section.
THE NAVY IMPLEMENTATION OF PERFORMANCE BUDGETING
Following the recommendation of the Hoover Commission and the
enactment of Title IV of the National Security Act Amendments of 1949,
the President requested the services to submit their 1951 budgets
along performance lines. Each of the services was given considerable
latitude in determing how they would reshape their appropriation
structure. The Navy implementation will be outlined in some detail
but the general pattern of events is more or less applicable to the
other two services.
The Navy had been facing a financial nightmare for a number
of years. At the close of World War II, it received its money in
61 different appropriations. This number was reduced in successive
years through 1950 to 48, a number that still posed severe adminis-
trative problems for the Navy's Bureau structure. These 48 appro-
priations were managed by twelve Bureau and Offices including the
Marine Corps. A Navy Department pamphlet published in 1950 gave
16

the following two deficiencies in the then current structure:
First, appropriation requests in the past have not been form-
ulated along program or functional lines. Consequently, no
bureau or office in the Department maintains accounts on a basis
which shows the cost of conducting such important naval programs.
as maintenance and operation of the fleet, medical care, and so
on. Programs of this nature are presently financed through nu-
merous appropriations. With the establishment of the Department
of Defense, the necessity of budgeting and accounting for funds
on a program basis became increasingly apparent, inasmuch as
budget determinations at various levels are made on the basis of
programs rather than of the bureau or office which will do the
work or of the particular objects of expenditure involved.
The second weakness in the present structure rests in the fact
that fiscal responsibility is diffused, with the result that in-
ternal management is unduly complicated. No one theory appears
to have been followed consistently in the evolution of the appro-
priation structure. Consequently, appropriations based on broad
functions are intermingled both with appropriations based upon
object classifications, such as transportation, and with appro-
priations based upon organizational concepts. In many instances
single field activities are now financed by numerous appropriations
with the result that no single bureau or office of the department
can exercise complete financial control over a field activity
under its cognizance, nor can a single bureau or office render
promptly a complete accounting of costs incurred.
5
The major emphasis in the fore-going was placed on the formulation
of programs that would permit the bureaus to exercise management
control. While the first paragraph talks about important naval pro-
grams, it should be noted that the programs themselves took the form
of the program for which a particular bureau was responsible. Thus
the cost of fleet maintenance and operation was a program adminis-
tered by the Bureau of Ships. The cost of manning these same ships
5Department of the Navy, "Concept of the Navy ' s 1931




was a separate program administered by the Bureau of Naval Personnel.
Medical care was administered by the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery
but the staffing of military personnel was again funded by BUP3RS.
The performance budget that the Navy implemented was developed along
program lines that reflected the organization of its bureaus and
offices. In this respect, it met the criteria of a budget that re-
vealed functions but it is extremely doubtful that this budget rep-
resented activity costs. Personnel costs represent 2^% of the mil-
itary budget. To exclude them from activity costs distorts both
budgeting and management.
The Navy's position with regard to program formulation stip-
ulated broad programs that could be used for evaluation and compar-
ison at the Defense level. To implement this within the existing
bureau structure, the Navy (and the Army and Air Force) ha d to
fragment its operating and capital programs. The semantic diff-
iculty in the term programming was here apparent. The program
could mean the end product that was being purchased or it could mean
a function that was contributing to the achievement of the end pro-
duct.
In the first case, a defense program would consist of all
that was reo
x
uired to operate a segment of the operating forces, for
example, the cost of Anti-Submarine Warfare. This type of program
would include the development, acquistion, and operation of all of
the factors involved in ASW. This program would clearly show what
18

was being procured with the money expended. In the latter case,
the functional program alligned itself vdth the contribution that
each of the technical bureaus made to the end product. Unfortu-
nately, each type of program answered the question - What is being
done with the money? In one case, it bought types of warfare, in
the other it bought personnel, operation, maintenance, and capital
equipment
.
The Navy placed great emphasis on its programs showing what
was being done with the money expended, but it never really faced
up to the true intent of this statement. The nature of its bureaus
prevented a budget structure based upon and products because the
bureaus themselves were contributors to end products. Each tech-
nical bureau was responsible (and still is) for providing certain
types of support to the operating forces. No single bureau had
total responsibility for any one end product. It was therefore im-
possible to construct a budget that showed end products and still
maintain the bureau administrative structure as the vehicle of its
implementation
.
The conclusions to be reached from this brief summary of the
history of performance budgeting is that there has been much sell-
ing of the term but very little implementation of Lhe practice.
It is strange- that a concept like this should have such wide spread
acceptance and so little compliance. Perhaps it is the very nature
of the concept itself. Is the performance of a defense activity or
19

any government activity measureable? It is possible to have a true
performance budget? The answers to these questions are implicit in
a definition of performance budgeting and shoudl be resolved in the
course of this study,
THE VARIOUS PROPOSALS FOR PERFORMANCE AND PROGRAM BUDGETING
The story has been told in Washington that Former President
Hoover himself invented the term "performance budget" to lend sales
appeal to a different and improved method of federal budgeting.
Whether fact or fancy, it remains true that the idea generated a
host of worthy reforms in federal spending. The Hoover Commission
itself was excedingly vague when it attempted to define its major
recommendations. Buck stated the following in the Task Force Report:
A program or performance budget should be substituted for the
present budget, thus presenting in a document of much briefer
compass the Government's expenditure requirements in terms of
services, activities, and work projects rather than in terms of
things bought.'''
Mr. Buck used the terms program and performance interchangebly in
this explanation making no effort to distinguish between a program
and its subsequent performance. The illustrations of programs given
in the Task Force Report did not clarify this point. They were
6Mosher, 0p_. Git., p. 78.
7'Task Force Report, Fiscal, Budgeting, and Accounting
Activities Washington, 1949* p. 43.
20

quite broad and are actually examples of simplifying ajid reducing the
appropriation structure in order to improve Congressional review.
In order to find the origin of the performance concept, it is
necessary to look at the movement for "efficiency and economy" in
government. This movement was stimulated by the transfer of economic
marginalism, which was in great repute at the turn of the Century,
towards the subject of government. This school of thought was given
the rather dubious title of Welfare Economics. The application of
efficiency to budgeting was an outgrowth of the use of the term in
'Welfare Economics. The major contention was that the cost of an ob-
ject could be equated to the amount of government service that could
be provided by the object. The following quotation illustrates this
point
:
Expenditure should be distributed between battleships and poor
relief in such wise that the last shilling devoted to each of
them yields that same return of satisfaction.. ..This method of
approach suggests an analogous test for determing how large gov-
ernment expenditures in the aggregate ought to be. If a commu-
nity were literally a unitary being, with government as a brain,
expenditure should be pushed in all directions up to the point
at which the satisfaction obtained from the last shilling expen-
ded is equal to the satisfaction lost in respect of the last
shilling called up on government service."
A.C. Pigou, A Study in Public Finance. (London: MacMillian
& Co., ltd., 1951), p. 31.
21

The extension of Welfare Economics into the field of budget-
ing is evident in the work of Herbert A. Simon.'' Simon drew a paral-
lel between private industry and government in the attainment of ef-
ficency. To replace the profit factor of industry as the criterion
for efficency, he suggested that government must substitute the ob-
jectives of the activity being appraised. These objectives would
be measured for the degree of attainment by the construction of in-
dicies. i\n index might be any measurement that indicates the effect
of an activity in accomplihing its final objective. This index is
just an attempt to replace profit with some other yardstick. Natu-
rally the definition of objectives is quite difficult when dealing
with the services rendered by government but Simon insisted that it
could be done. In fact he said that it was done in every admini-
stration. He did not, however, point out that this was a subjective
evaluation made by the administrator.
The attainment of the activities objectives is always a matter
of degree. This degree of attainment is seldom considered in the
formulation of policy and the administration of funds. Simon's use
of efficiency in administration would consider this factor. It would
also determine the choice between alternate objective. Efficiency
dicates that the choice be that which produces the largest result
9
This Section is drawn from Simon's chapter on efficiency.
See Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior , (New York: MacMllian
Company, 1947), pp. 172-197.
22

for the given application of resources.
Underlying this entire concept of efficiency in Public admin-
istration was Simon's proposal for budgeting. He would have two com-
prehensive budgets, an annual budget, and a long term budget. The
long term budget would be made up of several parts. First, there
would be long term estimates of trends in problem magnitude for the
various departments, eg., mileage of streets which must be kept
clean, population to be served by libraries, etc. There would be
long term estimates of service adequacy. This entails the level of
service that is to be afforded to the citizen. These two estimates
would then be combined into a long range work projection showing
work units for the services to be rendered and the facilities to be
constructed to achieve this program. The last part of the long range
budget would be the financial program that relates the work program
to the fiscal resources of the community. The annual budget is mere-
ly a segment of the long term budget. The approval of the former by
the legislature would also constitute approval of the annual budget.
It is difficult to classify Simon's proposal as a performance
type budget since its salient features are long term programs. How-
ever it does result in a work program composed of performance units
and in that context may be looked upon as a performance budget.
Since it was first proposed in 1938, it may be viewed as the fore-
runner of many of the more recent proposals for program budgets.
There is a certain amount of similarity between Simon's long range
23

budget and the program package of Hitch.
Before leaving Simon, a few words should be addressed to his
idea of functionalization as related to organization. This will be
seen as a major problem in both program and performance budgeting.
To have effective functionalization according to Simon, the tech-
nology of the organization must be such that the work of the agency-
can be broken into distinct portions, each of which contribute to
but one subsidiary objective. If this type of functionalization is
unrealistic, if it does not represent the true organization, it will
lead to deterioration in the quality of decisions:
For in this case the values which are affected by the unit's
activities, but which are not comprehended in the statement of
the organizational objectives, will be neglected in the decision
making process.-^
Thus Simon reached a conclusion that has been painfully learned by
many accountants, comptrollers, and management theorists. Organi-
zation must follow function and not vice versa.
Following Simon chronologically were the reforms in budgetary
preparation after World War II. Therewere the revisions prompted by
the necessity to streamline the hopelessly entangled appropriation
structure. As mentioned before, the movement originated in several
sectors of government. Notably the Navy Department and the Bureau




Commission. The next proposal for a "true" performance budget was
11
made by Frederick C. Mosher in 1954.
Mosher surveyed the new military performance budgets and
reached the conclusion that they were basically groupings of the
cost of supporting elements rather than of the operating elements.
He held that a true performance budget should answer such questions
as the following:
The program and the cost of combat operations; active defense
of the United States; other operations and maintenance; and build-up
for the future.
The program and cost of the basic components of air power -
strategic, tactical, air defense, and air transport.
The programs and costs for divisions of the Army. The cost
of building a division and the cost of maintaining a division.
The program and cost of training for all major military
programs.
The program and amounts of procurement for mobilization re-
serve.
The true costs of our various actual and proposed programs for
supporting our allies around the globe.
To solve this riddle of program vs. performance, Mosher proposed
HfFVinThis next section is based upon Mosher, 0p_. Git . , pp. 230-24V.
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two different budget systems. One would be designed for the develop-
ment, appraisal, and approval of future policies and programs at top
levels. The other would facilitate internal programming, management,
and control. He called the first type a program budget and the latter
an administrative budget. The program budget would be designed to
provide precise information to top management for review and decision
making. The programs would be presented in terms of costs and their
classification would be based upon the mission of the respective de-
partments, not the categories of cost of the items themselves. The
definition of this program budget is an expression of costs in terms
of things to be done rather than of things to be bought. Mosher's
primary program classification for the Army would include:
Combat Operations (if any)
Overseas Non-combat operations
Active Defense of the United States





Services (not directly allocable)
These broad programs would be subclassified into their most "mean-
ingful elements". The budget would also be supported with other
data such as size, type, and readiness of forces; projected require-
ments of key items of equipment, and projected personnel strength.
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All such estimates would be over all round numbers guesstimates.
Dollar detail for budgets that range in the billions are unnecessary,
confusing, and suggestive of a non existent degree of accuracy
according to Mosher.
The preparation of this type of budget would be at the planning
level. Budget and planning for the program budget would be integrated.
To accomplish this, the preparation, presentation, and justification
would be removed from the comptroller office and assigned to the
program planning units of the three services. This program develop-
ment would be performed at the top level in much the same manner as
the present Program Objectives. The field commands could make pro-
posals but the annual program budget would not require their special
or annual participation. Costing of the various programs would be
based upon previous experience. This method would require reliance
upon statistical skills rather than accounting. Mosher did not
claim that this type of estimating would achieve great accuracy but
he did feel it would do as well as the then current methods (circa
1952). Besides the degree of dollar accuracy is of secondary con-
sideration. The primary purpose of Mosher' s budget is to present
the proposed programs for the next fiscal year with their approx-
imate costs. The various review agencies and the Congress should
be concerned with basic questions such as; should this program be
undertaken? should this one be increased or decreased? After these
considerations, they might Review the adequacy of cost information
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but this is a secondary consideration. In addition to this cost-
ing of an annual program budget, Mosher also recommended that each
budget be accompained by projections of programs and approximates
of costs for the two years following the budget year.
The Administrative budget proposed by Mosher was a vehicle
for internal planning and control. Its size and content would
follow the approved program budget but it would utilize different
classifications. Preparation would be similar to the usual budget
formulation except that it would start one year later and thus be
based upon the more realistic assumptions of the President's budget.
It i>/ould be based upon firmer program objectives and a pretty reli-
able estimate of the funds to be available. This process bears
close resemblence to the present financial and funding plans that
are now in use since it would culminate in a request to the Bureau
of the Budget for apportionment of funds already approved under the
program budget.
The content of the administrative budget would be a detailed
statement of past, current, and proposed work and the associated
costs. It would be based upon a complete and critical examination
of past performance and future plans. The structure or primary
classification of the administrative budget would not be the program
but rather it would be based upon organizational classification.
Each command would constitute an organic class in this budget.
While Kosher proposed that budget estimates be presented and
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supported in detail by each activity, he held that the allocation
and allotment of funds should be in a lump sum. The activity might
be given certain guidelines on how bo spend the funds but the
Commanding Officer at each echelon would have the authority to apply
the funds in the most effective manner possible. He would thus have
authority to transfer funds to other uses as required by the circum-
stances. The Commanding Officer would have the responsibility for
these decisions and would nave to be prepared to defend them. How-
ever, there would be no question concerning his authority to make
such decisions.
To achieve more meaningful cost data accounting, Mosher
stressed the elimination of the various free issue items through
their capitalization in stock fund. He also recommended that the
pay of all military personnel except those assigned to tactical units
and those in full-time training be charged to the activity using
their services.
The general conclusions and recommendations made by Mosher
were followed in 1955 by another general survey of budgeting made
by Professor Arthur Smithies for the Committee on -iconomic Development.-^
Smithies' recommendations differ slightly from those of Mosher but
-^This section is drawn from Chapter X± of Smithies, The
Budgetary Process in the United States , (New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Co., Inc., 1955), pp. 257-277.
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they contain the same basic proposal for two budgets, the program
budget and the administrative budget. The later is almost a carbon
copy of the administration budget contained in Kosher' s work. It
too would follow the present funding programs that determine the
allocation of appropriations but it would be "improved and strength-
ened". The administrative budget would be the device used by top
service management to conduct "an annual spring house cleaning" ^
to review past, current, and proposed operations. The accounting
structure would follow organizational lines with no relation to the
program budget. A standard classification of functions would be
used to categorize the various programs for budgetary and work plan-
ning purposes. However, these would not limit the activity commander
in the exercise of his authority over funds alio ted to him. "The
Commanding Officer at each echelon should have authority to apply
the funds in the most effective way possible and to transfer funds
as local circumstances require. Only in this way can true command
responsibility be exercised'.1 . ^
As the prerequisite to the program budget, Smithies suggested
that the approval of the Program Objectives by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the National Security Council should only be given after
13Ibid




after these objectives have been costed out. He maintained that
these two bodies must be aware of the dollar consequences of their
decisions instead of waiting until each service had priced oui, its
version of the Program Objectives. This change would eliminate much
of the friction that now arrises annually between the President and
the military over the costs of military programs. This costing at
the time of JCS planning would also permit the budget time cycle to
be reduced by one year. In format, the Smithies' program budget would
distinguish costs by the types of forces, the costs of supporting
these forces, the cost of force build-up, mobilization reserves, re-
search and development, and general administration. These programs
would serve as the basis for Executive and Congressional review and
would then result in the annual appropriations. The budget would cover
a number of years and contain estimates of appropriations, obligations,
and expenditures as well as the effects of expected price changes on
these estimates in order to provide an indication of quantity. The
last proposal might be a trifle naieve from a political standpoint
since no administration would ever admit to an "expected" price level
increase. A further analysis of Mr. Smithies' program budget is un-
necessary since the examples he gave were limited to the Air Force and
they bear sufficient resemblence to the Hitch Program package to be
considered as an antecedent.
The second Hoover Commission made some notable contribution to
the field of defense budgeting but their report more or less deempha-
sized the term performance budgeting. The fourth recommendation of
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the Task Force on Budget and Accounting made the following reference;
(It is recommended) That the executive budget continue to be
based upon functions, activities, and projects adequately supported
by information on program costs and accomplishment, and by a review
of performance by organizational units where these do not coincide
with performance budget classification. ^5
If performance budgeting was the "theme song" of the first
Hoover Commission
,
accured expenditures accounting may be regard-
ed as the theme for the second Commission. In reviewing the Commis-
sions report on Business Organization, the terms accural accounting,
cost based budgets, and accured expenditures are frequently repeat-
ed.-1-' This report contains no reference, however, to existing per-
formance budgets. It did state that the existing budget system was
"defective as presently practiced in that it does not adequately
IS
reveal available resources or cost of performance".
In order to rectify this defective budgetary system, the task
force on budget and accounting recommended the elimination of ob-
ligation-type budgeting and the substitution in its place of an
accured expenditure budget. This budget would be based upon the
value of goods and services estimated to be received during the
fiscal year. Long lead-time programs such as weapons systems and
major construction i/ould be procured by the use of contract auth-
ority granted by Congress. This means that Congress would review
^Task Force Report on Budget and Accounting, (House Doc. 192,
84th Congress)
l6Mosher, 0p_. Cit., p. 73.




these programs annually in terms of costs and accomplishments, both
future and past. The committee also recommended the reduction of
budget preparation to a maximum of one year and the simplication of
what it called overly detailed justification data.
The most recent and by far the most important proposal for
improving the military performance budget was made by Mr. C. J.
Hitch, the present Assistant Secretary of Defense (Financial Man-
\ 19
agementj. 7 As the DOD Comptroller, Mr. Hitch had been able to
implement his proposals for program packages. The major contribution
that Hitch has made to the evolution of the program budget is to
place great emphasis on end-product missions that cross the tradi-
tional service department lines. He placed the various components
of the three services into three broad programs: (l) deterrence or
fighting of all-out war; (2) deterrence or fighting of limited war;
and (3) research and development, ,/hen the program package was in-
troduced into the fiscal 1963 budgetary process, this number was
expanded to nine packages.
As defined by Mr. Hitch, the program package in an inter-
related group of program elements that must be considered together
because they support each other or are close substitute for each
other. The program element is an integrated activity, a combination
19see c. J. Hitch and R. N. McKean, The Economics of Defense
in the Nuclear Age, (Cambridge, Mass: The Colonial Press Inc., I960).
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of men, equipment, and installations, whose effectiveness can be
20
related to national security policy objectives. As examples of
elements, Mr. H^tch used wings of B-52 bombers, infantry battalions
and combatant ships, taken together with all the equipment, men,
installations, supplies, and' support required to make them effective
military forces.
The first of the nine packages is termed the Central War
Offensive Forces Program. This package is divided into a number of
general categories: aircraft forces; land based missile forces; sea
based missile forces; command control, and communications systems;
and headquarters and command support. Mrcraft forces consist of
wings of B-52's (with air-to-surface missiles listed separately),
wings of B-58's and B 47' s, the tankers, and the RS-B - 70. The
missile forces are Atlas, Titan, Klnuteman, and Polaris. The
communication links and the command and control systems required
for the direction of the strategic forces are also included in this
package together with the headquarters and command support that is
required. Package two is the Central War Defensive Forces and is an
easily definable program. It consists of the Continental Air Defense
Command and the Civil Defense Program.
The third program package is the General Purpose Forces, by
Statement of Assistant Secretary of Defense C. J. Hitch
before the subcommittee on National Policy Machinery of the Senate
Committee on Government Operations, July, 24, 1961.
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far the largest of the programs. These are the forces that can be
used in either limited or general war. The package includes most
of the regular combat units of the Army, all of the Navy cambatant
units except polaris submarines, all Marine Corps units, and the
Tactical Air Command of the Air Force.
The fourth program package is composed of the sea and air
lift. It includes the troop carrier wings of the Air Force, the
Military Air Transport Service, and the Military Sea Transportation
Service. The Reserve and National Guard Forces make up the fifth
package. The elements are grouped by service and within each service
by the major mission to which they contribute.
Package six includes all research and development within the
Defense Department that does not contribute directly to a program
element. All space projects are grouped in this package. Service-
wide support is covered by the seventh program package. It contains
all activities that are not readily categorized into a mission, force,
or weapons system. Elements in this program include general training,
overhead for supply and maintenance systems, medical support, and
headquarters support. The eighth program consists of classified pro-
jects and the ninth funds the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Each of these programs and program elements are costed by the
services in several ways. They are developed by fiscal year into
new obligational authority and expenditures, by statuatory appropri-
ation accounts and budget titles, and finally by categories of cost.
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These categories distinguish between research and development, in-
vestment, and operating costs.
Research and development costs include all costs associated
with developing a new capability to the point where it is ready for
introduction into operational use. These costs include equipment
required for the development program and all related facilities,
supplies, and personnel relat-ed thereto.
Investment costs or capital expenditures are the one time
or initial outlays required after the development phase to introduce
a new system into operational use. This would include initial train-
ing, outfitting of spare parts, etc.
Operating costs may be defined as the recurring costs required
to maintain and operate the activity year by year throughout its ex-
pected life in operational use.
The implementation of the program package in fiscal 1963
followed the recommendation of all previous budgetary reformers in
reducing the time span for formulation to one year. The traditional
budgetary process was divided into two phases. The programming phase
from June until September and the budgetary phase from October through
November 1961. The programming phase differed from the proposals of
21Smithies, in that the programs were based upon general guidance con-
tained in the Basic National Security Policy issued by the National
213mithies, Op. Cit., p. 257-258
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Security Council. It may be remembered that Smithies proposed that
these major force objectives be costed prior to approval so that the
Joint Chiefs and the Council could recognize the financial implica-
tions of their policy objectives. The Hitch plan permits the services
to develop their programs without the imposition of arbitrary finan-
cial ceilings in the early stages of the budget cycle. The primary
purpose of the programming phase is to permit the Secretary of Defense
to evaluate the alternative programs proposed by the service as they
relate to achieving the national security objectives. This evaluation
is based upon cost and military worth comparisons of the various pro-
grams not only in terms of annual requirements but also ofrer the en-
tire life span of the particular program.
At the present time, the program package plan utilizes the
"performance budget" appropriation structure as its vehicle for sub-
mission to the Congress. It also lacks the second part of the two
part budget proposed by Smithies and Mosher. The use of an admini-




PROGRAM Vs. PERFORMANCE, SOME CONCLUSIONS
The literature that has been reviewed contained some signif-
icant proposals for budget formulation. Each proposal was concerned
with programs and program functions that related to some form of end
product. In this respect, they corresponded to the first Hoover
Committee's recommendation which called for a budget that revealed
"functions, activities, and projects." None of these proposals
could be termed a performance budget. This fact enables some con-
clusions to be drawn in this Chapter about the nature of program and
performance.
THE NATURE OF THE PROGRAM BUDGET
The terms program and performance may not be used interchange-
ably. As a result of the review in the previous Chapter, the program
budget has emerged as a concept of definitive content while perform-
ance has become increasingly obscure. The program itself may be de-
fined as a projection of future operations which is achieved through
a combination of policy, planning, and cost comparison. The program
budget is merely a translation of these future operations into dollars,
The framework or structure of the program is determined by the require-
ments of the agency or person making the decision between related pro-
grams. A program budget is a tool for review and decision at the
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highest level. It is designed for overall budgetary review but it
has little direct relation to performance.
Each proposal for a program budget has contained some refer-
ences to a system of controls that would permit a performance
evaluation of achievements that have been obtained. Each author,
however, stated that a true administrative budget that would report
performance would necessarily have to be structured about the or-
ganizational unit without regard function. The simple solution
would be lo match activity function to program function, or more
simply, to match program functions to activity function. The func-
tional budgets that were introduced in the early fifties did the
opposite.
The so called performance budgets that implemented the Hoover
recommendations selected functions that separated labor costs from
material costs at the Departmental level. This dichotomy has sub-
sequently made it almost impossible to evaluate the cost of acttiv-
ities, missions, and products, functional commands or geographic
areas. This functional budget was aptly described by Mr. Hitch as
"collections of objects used in a variety of tasks". Oddly enough,
the appropriation titles are properly described as programs, and it
is a functional budget. The trouble stems from the loose interpret-
ation that was placed on the terms functions, activities, and pro-
jects. This also applies to the answer that was made to the question
-•-Hitch and McKean, Op.. Git . , p. 53.
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of what is done with defense money.
The end product programs of Mr. Hitch come the closet to
describing what is done with defense money. The program elements
also come closer to being activity oriented than any of the other
proposals. Most of the organization within the program elements
contribute to but one program. Funds appropriated to these programs
would permit the use of but one allotment at most defense activities.
While it would probably be impractical to place all defense organi-
zations in an exact program, the end product appropriation would be
a vast improvement over the present type of functional classification,
THE NATURE OF PERFORMANCE BUDGETING
The performance budget has become an enigma. The term itself
contains an internal contradiction. By definition, performance
refers to the execution of a function; the accomplishment of some
action. Budget, on the other hand, denotes a plan for future
financial operations. It therefore becomes difficult it not im-
possible to plan for something that has already been accomplished.
The term performance should not have been applied to budgeting.
The concept that was expressed by the Hoover Commission was that of
a program budget. What was desired was a program budget that could
be administered on an activity basis in order to permit performance
evaluation. Had this concept been explicitly stated when functional
budgets were introduced, the present appropriation structure might
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bear a closer resemblence to the program proposals reviewed in this
study. The use of the word performance by the first Hoover Commission
sent people in many different directions in attempt to achieve ends
that lacked definition. Burkhead perceived this when he held that
2performance could only be based on the past.
THE MEASUREMENT OF PERFORMANCE
A number of conditions must be fulfilled in order to evaluate
performance. As mentioned before, the activity must conform or be
organized in such manner as to contribute to but one program. Second-
ly it must be possible to measure full costs. This later objective
may only be obtained through the use of accural accounting and costs
based budgets. A cost based or cost data budget is defined as one
which gives recognition to the costs of programs in terms of goods and
services actually consumed. Using cost data makes it possible to re-
view the balance of goods and services on hand that have been obtained
with prior appropriations, and determine the extent to v.iiich they will
be consumed during the budget period. This type of budgeting permits
the measurement of the flow of costs as they are actually consumed by
the performing activity. The advantage of the cost based budget is
that management can review total resources when preparing activity
budgets. Accural accounting is the tool which makes this
2Burkhead, 0p_. Git., p. 139.
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measurement possible. It gives recognition to receipt of goods and
services and the consumption or use of assets, as well as keeping an
account of assets and liabilities.
: LIMITS C? PERFI VALUATION
It is possible to construct an accounting system to report
the achievement of program objectives. This accounting system would
be based upon the organizational units that contributed to the pro-
gram. This performance unit or classification would relate things
bought for defense to the mission of the activity for which bought.
It would provide the link between things bought and things done or
accomplished. For example, all items involved in the operation of
a Polaris submarine would be chargeable to that particular element
in the Hitch program. In doing this, the performance unit being
measured is the Polaris program in its relation to other program
elements of like mission. Charging objects bought to an end pro-
duct does not mean that the performance of the end product is being
measured. A standard of performance has not been set by establishing
a performance classification.
Considered on its own, performance classification does not
produce better programs at lower costs. It does permit review and
comparison of alternate programs by top management. However, the
measurement of performance for a particular program element or
activity within an element is beyond the scope of budgeting and
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financial management. The performance of a unit with a military
mission cannot be best measured in terras of dollars. What is
measurable is the amount of defense that has been procured with a
particular program. Most of the confusion with regard to perfor-
mance has been in this area. Performance has been construed to
mean activity accomplishment in the industrial or commercial sense.
Higher production rates, lower overhead, greater profit, are the
common indicators that are considered when one thinks of performance.
They do not exist in the military except in a few quasi-commercial
type activities. When the term performance is applied to military
spending, it can only refer to achieving the program objectives that
were stipulated in the original budget at a cost equal to or less
than that anticipated.
The difficulties inherent in performance evaluation of a
military unit can be demonstrated by examining its application to
a fleet ship, a destroyer, for example. Assume that this ship were
given all of the accounting devices and tools associated with per-
formance reporting. Its inventories would be capitalized and it
would use accrual accounting. It should be possible to measure the
performance of this destroyer by equating the amount of money expend-
ed to the degree within which this ship met the object of its pro-
gram mission. Unfortunately, neither side of this equation is
subject to financial measurement.
The amount of funds expended by a fleet ship is subject to
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many variables. Perhaps the most important of these being the
maintenance policy of the ship and the maintenance capability of
the ship's crew. A ship that performs extensive maintenance may
expend twice the funds of a sister ship that performs little or no
maintenance. The effect of this policy might become apparent in
the ship's ability to meet operational commitments but this is
subject to chance. Lack of maintenance might also become apparent
during ship overhaul but it would take a superior being to wade
through a ship's repair list to sort out those costs that were due
solely to poor maintenance. Other factors that effect a ship's ex-
penditure level include its area of operation, type of operation,
and type of equipment installed on board. Gold weather operations
usually result in higher costs. A ship deployed will use electronic
equipment for a greater number of hours than a ship operating in
U.S. waters and consequently replace more tubes and parts. The type
of magnetron tube utilized by a ship's radar can have a significant
effect on total expenditures. The price of these tubes range from
$670 to 38800. It is therefore extremely difficult to measure the
expense side of the equation in evaluating a ship's performance.
The performance side of the equation is even more difficult
to evaluate. The closet thing to performance evaluation now in use
is the ship's competitive standing in fleet exercises. This meas-
urement might be used but its adequacy is most questionable. These
have been but a few of the reasons for the difficulty that would be
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encountered in evaluating the military performance of a defense unit
of the other services. In the last analysis, military performance
is an abstract and unknown quantity until the shooting starts.
PROGRAM PERFORMANCE
Perhaps the most important aspect of this study is to empha-
size the distinction that must be made between program performance
and military mission performance. While it is difficult to use dollars
to measure the manner in which a unit performs its military mission,
these same dollars are the main basis for measuring program perform-
ance. Program performance may be defined as the measurement of in-
dividual activity and aggregate costs incurred in establishing and
maintaining a particular defense program or program element. Program
Performance does not permit the evaluation of the military worth or
military readiness of the performing units. Its function is to pro-
vide defense management with reports of actual costs incurred in the
accomplishment of a program. It follows from this that program
performance can not be used as the basis for the construction of
activity budgets. This is because the performing unit is merely
spending the amount of money originally projected in the program
budget. There is no performance requirement to stimulate economy
in operations other than a budgetary ceiling. The lack of performance
indicators inherent in defense activities therefore requires exten-
sive use of administrative budgets to control expenditures. This
type of budgeting must be based upon historical costs
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and comparsions between similar activities. It cannot be based upon
activity performance.
SUMMARY
A distinction has been made between program and performance
budgeting. The use of the word performance by the first Hoover
Commission appears to have caused the subsequent difficulties in
establishing "performance budgets" within the Defense Department.
In implementing a budget that revealed what government does with
its money, the Defense Department selected functions that were in
consonance with previous appropriations titles and more or less
corresponded to departmental organizations. The revised budgetary
structure consisted of programs that made it impossible to determine
activity costs. This condition still exists in the present appro-
priation structure. A true functional budget that depicts the cost
of defense activities must reveal what is achieved. The functions
that were selected in the "performance" appropriation structure were
intermediate products. They do not reveal the kind of defense that
is being bought. The end product approach that was proposed by
Mosher, Smithies, and finally Hitch solves this problem. These
functional budgets are based upon military programs and may be termed
program budgets.
Performance budgets never existed as such. There have been
budgets that permitted the measurement of performance but these are
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more properly described as cost-based budgets. They are dependent
upon a product that has measureble output. That is, they can only
be used when it is possible to measure activity output in some con-
crete terms. It is also necessary that the output be directly and
completely related to the amount budgeted. It has been shown that
this type of budget will not measure the performance of a Defense
Activity. However it was shown that the program contribution of a
defense activity could be measured. This measurement was termed
program performance, a type of performance which informs top man-
agement of the actual program costs for defense. While this is a
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